Капитан ТС (vbulahtin) wrote,
Капитан ТС

Иракское досье

Еще одна часть Отчета Чилкота -- документальные записи, воспоминания официальных лиц администрации Буша и свидетельства и материалы Chilcot Panel, подтверждают тезис о том, что Соединенные Штаты начали войну в Ираке без четкого (надлежащего, полного) рассмотрения вопроса, имеются ли причины для военного конфликта и с учетом свидетельств, что война будет регрессом.

Read the Documents

Document 1
United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Overseas and Defense Secretariat, “Iraq: Options Paper,” March 8, 2002
SOURCE: Downing Street Documents

The paper notes quite directly, “The US administration has lost faith in containment and is now considering regime change.” Options for that range are noted in the main text but, the paper adds, “are not mutually exclusive.” The paper admits, “A legal justification for invasion would be needed” and that “none currently exists.” The Cabinet Office analysts recommended a “staged approach” to establish international support, which would anyway be consonant with the requirement for a six-month interval to prepare for military action.

Document 2
Department of State, “Jordan: Talking Points for Vice-President’s Expanded Meeting with King Abdullah,” February 23, 2002
SOURCE: FOIA release to the National Security Archive

Vice  President Cheney was to discuss a variety of topics with the Jordanian king during this early 2002 visit, including actions on counterterrorism and the Middle East peace process in addition to the Iraq project. This paper, although heavily redacted, suggests Bush administration reluctance to take concrete measures on Middle East peace—it would “send [special negotiator] Zinni back when such a mission can be effective”—and its enthusiasm for action on Iraq.

Document 3
Department of State, “Jordan: Talking Points for Restricted Meeting with King Abdullah,” February 24, 2002
SOURCE: FOIA release to the National Security Archive

Unlike in his wider meeting, at Cheney’s private meeting with King Abdullah the Iraq issue led the agenda, and with the point that “Saddam Hussein is a threat to U.S. and regional interests,” following up with the declaration that “we are determined to address that threat.” King Abdullah was to be given assurances that the United States would “keep in mind Jordan’s concerns and vulnerability.” Reflecting State Department interests that differed from Cheney’s, the talking points emphasize that the U.S. had insisted on the return of UN weapons inspectors.

Document 4
Department of State, Briefing Memorandum, William Burns-Colin Powell, “Principals’ Committee Meeting on the Vice-President’s Trip, March 26, 2002” March 25, 2002
SOURCE: FOIA release to the National Security Archive

Although this memorandum is largely opaque due to heavy redaction, it establishes that this Principals’ meeting had been called by Vice President Cheney, and that one of its purposes was “previewing the next steps toward Iraq.”

Document 5
United Kingdom Government, Prime Minister’s Office, Memorandum, David Manning-Tony Blair, March 14, 2002
SOURCE: Downing Street Documents

Here a senior adviser to Prime Minister Blair reports on a dinner conversation on “Tuesday” (March 12) with Condoleezza Rice along with discussions with the “NSC team” the following day. Manning assured the Americans that, as he told Blair, “you would not budge in your support for regime change” and that “failure was not an option.” Manning also emphasized Blair’s political problems with this course, noting the need to “manage” domestic opinion (see upcoming National Security Archive EBB No. 329). He reports Rice’s “enthusiasm” for regime change and relates that President Bush still needed to work out the value of the Iraqi exiles, ways to coordinate “a US/allied military campaign with internal opposition,” and “what happens on the morning after.” Manning provides advice to Blair on how to proceed with Bush at the Crawford meetings, estimating that the resistance to Bush’s plans by “other European leaders” would give the UK “real influence” on public relations strategy, UN weapons inspections, and the military planning.

Document 6
United Kingdom, Washington Embassy, Memorandum, Christopher Meyer-David Manning, “Iraq and Afghanistan, Conversation with Wolfowitz,” March 18, 2002
SOURCE: Downing Street Documents

Ambassador Meyer reports on a lunch the previous day with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, saying that he had stuck closely to the script Manning had used a few days earlier: “We backed regime change but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option.” Meyer emphasized war would be a “tough sell” for the Blair government, which was considering putting out a white paper to make the case against Saddam. Much of Wolfowitz’s concern was about squabbles within the Bush administration over which factions of Iraqi exiles to back. On the British side (see the forthcoming National Security Archive EBB No. 329) Ambassador Meyer emphasized that “if the UK were to join with the US in any operation against Saddam, we would have to be able to take a critical mass of parliamentary and public opinion with us.”

Document 7
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Circular Cable Diptel 73, 101727Z April 10, 2002
SOURCE: Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot Committee) release

This cable, for the general guidance of British diplomatic missions, furnished a private but not intimate version of developments at Crawford. Thus it contained material essentially for public consumption, such as the statement that “the Prime Minister came away convinced that President Bush would act in a calm, measured and sensible but firm way.” However, the message also noted agreement that “letting [Iraq’s WMD] program continue unhindered was not an option.”

Document 8
Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Vice-President, Secretary of State, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “Iraq Inspections/UN Strategy,” no date
SOURCE: waranddecision.com

In anticipation of a round of UN-Iraq negotiations about the resumption of international inspections in Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld insists on the need to “stay one step ahead of the negotiations” and lays out his assessment. Rumsfeld declares that intrusive inspections, even over a period of years, had “missed significant parts of the Iraqi program and failed to detect an ongoing buildup.” the defense secretary wanted linkages between inspection and enforcement, unilateral intelligence capability to complement inspections, and effectively, U.S. control over the international inspections.

Document 9
Department of Defense Paper, “Dealing with Iraq WMD: The Inspection Option,” no date
SOURCE: DOD Iraq Documents release 5/08, Group 1, item 1

A factual paper supplementing the Rumsfeld memorandum (Document 8) gives additional details on rationale and on the anticipated U.S. strategy and tactics, including the point that “eliminating this WMD threat may ultimately require military action.” The paper does, however, note that “we may first want to try to put in place an inspection regime.” In a more detailed action plan than Rumsfeld had provided, the paper adds that “the only inspection regime that will come close to stopping Saddam will be an inspection team headed by an American.”

Document 10
DOD/OUSDP Memorandum, “Read Ahead for Secretary Rumsfeld RC Meeting, Tuesday April 16, 2002: ‘Necessity for Full Range of Training for Iraqi Opposition,’” April 12, 2002
SOURCE: http://www.waranddecision.com/doclib/20080420_Readaheadontrainingopp.pdf

A cover note from Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter W. Rodman makes clear that by April 2002 the Pentagon has already completed action on a “decision package” of materials regarding “providing a full range of military training to the Iraqi opposition,” to include combat training, and is taking that choice forward to the NSC Principals’ Committee. The Department of Defense argues that previous limitations on support to the level of “non-lethal” aid are not based upon legal restrictions, and that combat training “is a necessary first step in implementing the President’s guidance.” Such training will build trust with the Iraqi exiles, “reduces the possibility of fratricide” in a collaborative military operation, and would increase its effectiveness.

Document 11
CENTCOM, General Tommy Franks, “AOR Trip: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UK, 19-26 April 2002,” April 29, 2002
SOURCE: FOIA release to the National Security Archive

In his trip report for a crucial period immediately following the Crawford summit, General Franks recounts conversations with officials in the region as well as key military contacts in the United Kingdom. Although the paper is heavily redacted there is sufficient text available to show that Iraq operations were a specific subject with American regional commanders in Kuwait and also with Saudi and British officials. An attached reporting cable records the Saudis specifically raising the possibility that the U.S. could conduct Southern Watch air operations with “other assets besides those in Saudi Arabia.” In language still deleted in the document the Saudis clearly brought the discussion around to Iraq, for “General Franks pointed out that Iraq had nothing to do with [Operation Enduring Freedom].” As for the British, subjects being considered in their military planning circle included potential courses of action: “what are regime power centers, how to exploit the no fly zones, what could be done with the Iraqi army?” These were all issues of concern only in connection with  specific intended military operations.

Document 12
Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Assessment, “Western Europe: Publics Support Action Against Iraq,” April 10, 2002
SOURCE: FOIA release to the National Security Archive

State Department intelligence cites opinion polls recording substantial support in Western Europe for military action against Iraq. Public opinion was strongest for action to eliminate the ability to produce weapons of mass destruction, and more mixed on action “forcibly to remove terrorists and shut down training camps.” By far the strongest public support existed in the United Kingdom and France. There was majority support in Spain, but in Germany and Italy narrow pluralities opposedaction against terrorists though majorities did favor moves against WMDs. These figures suggest reasons the Bush and Blair governments chose to rely upon weapons of mass destruction as their main justifications for action. It is notable that no similar internal reports assessing European opinion regarding war have so far emerged that cover the long period over the remainder of 2002 in which support for military action steadily eroded.

Document 13
United Kingdom, Cabinet Office Options Paper (with legal annex), “Iraq: Conditions for Military Action (A Note by Officials).” July 21, 2002
SOURCE: Printed in The Sunday Times, June 12/19, 2005; Downing Street Documents

This briefing paper confirms Blair’s agreement to military action against Iraq at the Crawford summit, “provided that certain conditions were met.” It specifies that the goal of military action will be “a stable and law-abiding Iraq,” but notes the need “to engage the US on the need to set military plans within a realistic political strategy.” Problems anticipated include preparing British military forces, identifying a post-Saddam leadership for Iraq, the overall Middle East situation, and, in the annex, the legal justification for the resort to force, plus the lack of one for the “Southern Watch” air campaign. The British also emphasized that force might be used only once “the options for action to eliminate Iraq’s WMD through the UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted.” The legal justification would in fact rely upon UN Security Council resolutions that provided for these weapons inspectors.

Document 14
United Kingdom, Matthew Rycroft, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, Cabinet Minutes of Discussion, S 195/02, July 23, 2002
SOURCE: Printed in The Sunday Times, May 1, 2005, Downing Street Documents

These notes offer insight into the attitude of the Bush administration toward regime change, the UN route, and propaganda efforts. The document contains the now-notorious statement in which Sir Richard Dearlove, chief of British foreign intelligence (“C”), reports from his talks in Washington: “There was a perceptible change in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction between terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.” Dearlove also reported that the Bush “NSC has no patience with the UN route.” Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, chief of defense staff, then added a briefing on actual plans for an invasion, showing these to be far advanced at this date, before UN inspections were even accepted by all parties concerned. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, noting “the case was thin,” argued for enlisting U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to persuade President Bush to back UN inspections, but he warned, “It seemed clear that Bush has made up his mind to take military action.”

Document 15
DOD/OUSDP Memorandum to Commander, U.S. Central Command, no date
SOURCE: DOD Iraq documents release 5/08, Group 2, item 2

This memorandum from the office of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith furnished guidance intended for CENTCOM information warfare specialists, public diplomacy officers and public affairs officials regarding “declaratory policy for Iraq” on both WMDs and other weapons. The memo discusses developing a line of argument to take were Saddam actually to use weapons of mass destruction, the possibility of an ultimatum to Baghdad, themes for propaganda, and other measures. The paper concedes that “the more difficult part is to determine what to say publicly” and expresses the wish “to portray our action as a liberation of Iraq from a tyrant.” Saddam is to be kept in ignorance of the threat for as long as possible.

Document 16
Central Command, “Compartmented Concept Update,” August 4, 2002
SOURCE: FOIA release to the National Security Archive

This set of briefing slides presents the overall concept for what would be known to military planners as the “hybrid” war plan, in which war would be launched before forces had reached their full capability, and follow-on increments would supplement the initial attack. The briefing covered such issues as the phases of conflict, ending with a “Phase IV” occupation of Iraq, the time necessary to generate the forces and complete the buildup, and an overview of the military strategy used in the invasion.

Document 17
CIA, Intelligence Analysis, “The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq,” NESAF 2002-20104, August 7, 2002.
SOURCE: FOIA release to the National Security Archive

The CIA here notes that “obtaining an international mandate and regional support will be key for any US occupation of Iraq,” a situation different from that following World War II when Washington had had “both a sweeping international mandate and long-lasting support of key regional countries.” The paper proceeded with a series of comparisons along different dimensions, warning that a long (seven-year) occupation from 1945 had “only laid the groundwork for success.” In general the paper warned of many issues that would actually become central to the Iraq occupation, but its analysis fell short. For example the CIA predicted that humanitarian relief would initially be the main problem, and that reforms would encounter an entrenched Sunni power elite. The CIA believed that the German model offered the best parallel for Iraq.

Document 18
DOD/OUSDP Memorandum, Peter W. Rodman-Donald Rumsfeld, “Who Will Govern Iraq?” August 15, 2002
SOURCE: Douglas Feith, War and Decision, pp. 546-548

Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman discusses a State Department proposal for a “Transitional Civil Authority” in Iraq after conquest is completed. Rodman rejects the State Department analogy to the occupations of Japan and Germany after World War II in favor of one to postwar France, and also refers to experiences in Afghanistan, which he holds out as “the model to be followed,” although “the Iraqis are not yet ready for their Bonn process.”   The “Bonn process” is a reference to the 2003 conference that created what became the Karzai government in Afghanistan. The idea that Iraq was not yet ready for such a step would lead to establishment of the Pentagon-led Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. The document suggests that already by the summer of 2002 the Pentagon was taking control of policy for an occupation of Iraq.

Note on the Downing Street Documents: The various British documents cited from this source first appeared as leaks to news media. They have since been confirmed as authentic and have been explicitly discussed as true records by the Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot Committee) and other official British investigations of events in the Iraq war.


promo vbulahtin october 31, 2013 17:34 42
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Еще раз хвастаюсь статьёй в газете "Завтра" в честь 170-летнего юбилея со дня рождения незаслуженно забытого Г.И.Успенского (под катом привожу авторский вариант - почти все фото плохого качества, но их не было в Интернете до моих заметок про Успенского в этом блоге). В основном, всё уже…
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